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NOTE
OBSCENITYt ON-LINE: A TRANSACTIONAL
APPROACH TO
COMPUTER TRANSFERS OF POTENTIALLY
OBSCENE MATERIALtt
t Obscenity is a legal conclusion, much like proximate cause. See Paris Adult Theatre
I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 92 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[O]ne cannot say with
certainty that material is obscene until at least five members of this Court . . .have
pronounced it so."). Material that has not been adjudicated cannot correctly be termed
"obscene," because no conclusion has been reached regarding it. This Note uses
"obscene" in this literal sense, substituting "allegedly obscene," "offensive," "indecent," and
similar terms when applied to material about which the obscenity question might be
raised. The term "pornography" and its cognates are avoided, both because of the
emotional baggage they carry, and because they are sometimes used in the sense of
"obscene" and sometimes in the sense of "offensive." The term "obscenity," as used in this
Note, refers to the set of legal issues involving allegedly obscene material.
Allegedly obscene materials enjoy First Amendment protection. See Roaden v.
Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496, 504 (1973) (explaining that potentially obscene materials receive
.presumptive protection" under the First Amendment). A charge that material is obscene
must overcome this constitutional hurdle.
"Child pornography" does not enjoy First Amendment protection. See New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982). This Note does not discuss child pornography because the
constitutional dimension is central to its analysis.
ft "On-line" is a general term which means "having to do with networked computers."
Donna A. Gallagher, Comment, Free Speech on the Line: Modern Technology and the First
Amendment, 3 CoMMLAw CONSPEC-ruS 197, 197-98 n.6 (1995); see also HoWARD RHEINGOLD,
THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY. HOMESTEADING ON THE ELECrRONIc FRONTIER 7 (1993).
Computers are "networked" when they are connected to permit transmission of data from
one to another. See Gallagher, supra, at 197-99. In particular, on-line often refers to the
domain of computer-mediated communication (CMC), see RHEINGOLD, supra, at 5-7, which,
broadly described, is the use of networked computers for interpersonal communication.
See Michel Bauwens, What is Cyberspace., COMPUTERS IN LIBRARIES, Apr. 1994, at 42. There
are many sorts of CMC: for example, electronic mail (e-mail), see id.; transfer of
documents, databases, images, sounds, programs, or any other kind of computer file (file
transfer), see id. at 42-44; "party line" connections that allow users to send messages to the
connected users in real time (chat rooms); more elaborate "virtual reality" environments
where users interact with each other and with objects they program into the environment
(MUDs, MOOs); and multimedia hypertext as found on the World Wide Web (WWW).
"Virtual" indicates having existence on-line only. "Cyber-" is a prefix with a range of
meanings from "on-line" to "virtual." "Cyberspace" is the on-line environment in its
entirety, viewed metaphorically as a place. See Andrew Grosso, Feature, The National
Information Infrastructure, 41 FED. B. NEws &J. 481, 481 (1994) (citation omitted); Bauwens,
supra, at 42. The "virtual" or "cyber" community is the set of on-line computer users,
viewed metaphorically as the citizens or occupants of cyberspace. "Hypertext" refers to a
system of associational links that allow the computer user to "jump" to related information
easily. "Downloading" is the process of transferring files from an on-line source to the
user's own computer. See Carlin Meyer, Reclaiming Sex from the Pornographers: Cybersexual
Possibilities, 83 GEo. LJ. 1969, 1969 n.4 (1995). The most familiar CMC environments are
the local-area networks (LANs) found in many offices; the wide-area networks (WANs)
used by geographically extended organizations; computer bulletin-board systems (BBSs);
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INTRODUCTION
United States Supreme Court decisions denying First Amend-
ment protection to obscene materials' are in tension 2 with the right
the Court has upheld to possess obscene materials in the privacy of
one's home.3 In order to allow regulation of obscene materials while
respecting the right to private possession, the Court has found that
states have a legitimate interest in protecting the public from contact
with obscene materials in the community.4 In some cases in which the
Court has allowed regulation, this risk of public contact has been re-
mote, 5 putting a great strain on the community-contact rationale.
6
Computer-mediated communications further highlight this tension by
providing the means to deliver obscene materials directly into the pri-
vacy of one's home, without risk of contact with the community at
large.7
This Note argues that contrary to the suggestions of some recent
commentators,8 existing law can satisfactorily handle obscenity on
and the Internet, which is a huge system interconnecting many LANs and WANs. See
Grosso, supra, at 481-83 (discussing BBSs and the Internet).
Obscenity on-line, then, refers to the set of issues raised by potentially obscene
materials in the context of computer-mediated communications.
1 See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 111 (1974); United States v. Orito, 413
U.S. 139 (1973); United States v. 12 200-foot Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123, 126
(1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 54 (1973); Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 23-25 (1973); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 356 (1971); Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) ("obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech or press"); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). See also Kois v.
Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229, 230 (1972) (obscenity is not protected under the First or Four-
teenth Amendments) (citing Roth);Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187 (1964) (obscenity
is not subject to the guarantees of free speech and press).
2 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 15-7, at 1322-23 (2d ed.
1988); Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 198 (1977) (Stevens,J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (stating that it is "somewhat illogical ... that a person may be prose-
cuted.., for providing another with material he has a constitutional right to possess").
s See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (asserting "the right [of a person]
to read or observe what he pleases-the right to satisfy his intellectual and emotional
needs in the privacy of his own home").
4 See United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. at 143 (distinguishing between private posses-
sion and transportation on the ground of the risk of loss of control of the materials during
transportation "regardless of a transporter's professed intent").
5 For example, there is very little risk of contact between obscene material entrusted
to the Post Office in a plain wrapper and the community at large. Only in the case of
misdirection, theft, or accidental rupture of the packaging is the public at risk of exposure
to the materials. See William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real World Prece-
dent to the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE Foarsr L. REv. 197, 209 (1995).
6 See infra Part I.B.
7 See infra Part I.B; Electronic Frontier Foundation, Brief for Amicus Curiae at 5,
United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir.) (Nos: 94-6648/6649) (stating that
"networked communications ... never actually enter any physical community"), cert. denied,
117 S. Ct 74 (1996).
8 See TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-25, at 1007; Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Auton-
omy, and Accountability: Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE LJ. 1639,
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computer networks.9 The law need not and should not recognize a
"virtual community" for purposes of the community standards analysis
set forth in Miller v. California.a0 However, to facilitate the Court's pol-
icy of allowing local communities to set their own standards, and to
avoid inequitable decisions under the existing law, courts need to re-
examine their understanding of on-line transactions. This Note ar-
gues that the usual case of computer transaction-a willing viewer
downloading" potentially obscene materials on-line-is similar to the
recipient traveling to the supplier's location and returning with the
1652-54 (1995) (asserting the independence of the "virtual community" of computer-medi-
ated communicators from geographical communities, and arguing that the virtual commu-
nity's standards should govern an obscenity analysis, at least where no harmful
consequences can be demonstrated in a geographical community); Byassee, supra note 5,
at 209-10 ("[T]he computer user's interaction transcends the local community because
that user, from the privacy of her own home, is participating in a community for which
geographical bounds are irrelevant. The physical conduct of using the computer-of con-
necting to cyberspace-may occur in a physical location, but that is not the conduct to
which the community standards test applies."); Mike W. Godwin, The First Amendment in
Cyberspace, 4 TEMP. POL. & Crv. R-s. L. REv. 1, 8 (1994) (advocating use of the "cyber-
community" for community standards analysis); Symposium, First Amendment and the Media:
Regulating Interactive Communications on the Information Superhighway, Panel I: The Changing
Landscape of First Amendment Jurisprudence in Light of the Technological Advances in Media, 5
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENrr. LJ. 235, 254-55 (1995) [hereinafter Symposium,
First Amendment and the Media] (advocating either a national obscenity standard or the use
of the "cyber-community" for community standards analysis); Dennis W. Chiu, Comment,
Obscenity on the Internet: Local Community Standards for Obscenity are Unworkable on the Informa-
tion Superhighway, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 185, 189 (1995) (advocating a national obscenity
standard); Jeffrey E. Faucette, Note, The Freedom of Speech at Risk in Cyberspace: Obscenity
Doctrine and a Frightened University's Censorship of Sex on the Internet, 44 DuKE LJ. 1155, 1166
(1995) (noting that "it is unclear what the community standard test means when applied to
a nonphysical community"); Robert F. Goldman, Note, Put Another Log on the Fire, There's a
Chill on the Internet: The Effect of Applying Current Anti-Obscenity Laws to Online Communications,
29 GA. L. REV. 1075, 1104-05 (1995) (arguing that "dropping the 'community standards'
prong of the Miller test seems the obvious solution for a medium such as the Internet,
which knows no geographical or jurisdictional boundaries"); Joanna H. Kim, Comment,
Cyber-Porn Obscenity: The Viability of Local Community Standards and the Federal Venue Rules in
the Computer Network Age, 15 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 415, 430, 441 (1995) (advocating use of the
virtual community for community standards analysis; suggesting either a national obscen-
ity standard, the virtual community standard, a national per se obscenity rule, or limiting
venue to the place of dispatch).
9 Professor Sunstein, among others, has advanced this view. See Cass R. Sunstein, The
First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. i757, 1792 (1995) (arguing that although com-
puter-mediated communications "put high pressure on old [legal] categories[,] ... it is by
no means clear that the basic principles [of law] will themselves have to be much
changed."). But while Professor Sunstein argues that ordinary mail provides the best anal-
ogy for computer-mediated communications, id. at 1799, this Note rejects the postal anal-
ogy. See infra Part iA
10 413 U.S. 15, 33 (1973) ("People in different States vary in their tastes and attitudes,
and this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity.").
11 "Downloading" is the process of transferring files from a computer dedicated to
storing files (a "server") to a user's computer.
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allegedly obscene material,' 2 yet distinguishable from the supplier
sending the allegedly obscene material to the recipient. This view of
the on-line transaction would not impose liability on suppliers for
making available material that meets the standards of the community
where the supplier's computer is located.
Part I reviews American obscenity law with particular attention to
the tension mentioned above and to the rationales for court decisions,
advancing a view that describes the tension as a conflict between the
privacy rights of willing viewers and the privacy rights of people who
wish to prevent their (and their children's) exposure to obscene
materials. Part II considers whether existing law is adequate to the
task of deciding on-line obscenity issues, or whether a new paradigm is
required. Several views are examined, including the view that the vir-
tual community should be the relevant community for Miller commu-
nity standards analysis. This Note concludes that the virtual
community view is incorrect, and that existing law is adequate for de-
ciding the usual on-line obscenity cases. Part III considers which geo-
graphical community-that of the provider or that of the recipient of
the potentially obscene materials-should govern the Miller commu-
nity standards analysis in on-line cases, concluding that the standards
of the provider's community should govern. Part IV examines recent
constitutional challenges to federal obscenity law, concluding that
facts about the Internet found independently by two federal three-
judge panels, which are likely to be ratified by the Supreme Court on
review, strongly support the arguments of this Note.
To put the issues raised in a practical perspective, this Note exam-
ines United States v. Thomas.'3 However, the analysis is not confined to
the facts or to the issues raised at trial or on appeal in Thomas.
12 See Electronic Frontier Foundation, Brief for Amicus Curiae at 6, United States v.
Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir.) (Nos. 94-6648/6649) (downloading files from a BBS is
"operationally indistinguishable" from traveling to obtain them, and in the latter case the
law imposes no liability on the seller), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 74 (1996); Electronic Frontier
Foundation, A Virtual Amicus Brief in the AmateurAction Appeal (visited Apr. 1, 1997) <http:/
/www.eff.org/pub/Legal/Cases/AABBSThomases_ Memphis/Old/
aaeff_virtual_amicus.brief> (downloading files from a BBS is "operationally indistinguish-
able" from traveling to obtain them, and imposing liability on the recipient would be "tan-
tamount to restricting the purchaser's constitutionally-protected right to interstate travel");
Kim, supra note 8, at 434 (briefly mentioning this analogy); Sex on the Internet: When Bavaria
Wrinkles its Nose, Must the Whole World Catch a Cold? THE ECONOMisT, Jan. 6 1996, at 18.
13 United States v. Thomas, CR-94-20019-G (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 13, 1994) (conviction
and forfeiture order) (a California couple who operated an adult BBS were convicted on
federal obscenity charges in Memphis, Tennessee, when images downloaded by a postal
inspector in Memphis were judged obscene by local community standards), aff'd, 74 F.3d
701 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 74 (1996).
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BACKGROUND: AMERICAN OBSCENITY LAW
A. Case Law'
4
1. Protection for the Private Possession of Obscene Materials
Although the states and the federal government have great lati-
tude to regulate obscene materials,' 5 that power is not absolute. In
Stanley v. Georgia,'6 the Court held that "the First and Fourteenth
Amendments prohibit making mere private possession of obscene ma-
terial a crime."'
17
Government agents executed a search warrant for evidence of
Stanley's alleged bookmaking activities.' 8 The agents found three
reels of movie film in a desk drawer.19 After viewing the films on Stan-
ley's projector, they concluded that the films were obscene and ar-
rested Stanley for violating a Georgia obscenity statute. 20 Stanley did
not dispute the obscene nature of the films, and the Court assumed
that they were obscene "under any of the tests advanced by members
of this Court."21
Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, distinguished mere private
possession of obscene materials from "public actions" such as distribu-
tion and dissemination.22 Although Marshall recognized that "Roth
14 The discussion in this Part owes a debt to Professor Tribe's treatment of obscenity
law, see TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-16, and to FREDERICK F. SCHAUER, THE LAW OF OBSCENITY
(1976). Summaries of American obscenity law are also given in Honorable Joseph T.
Clark, The "Community Standard" in the Trial of Obscenity Cases-A Mandate for Empirical
Evidence in Search of the Truth, 20 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 13 (1993); Scot A. Duvall, A Call For
Obscenity Law Reform, 1 WM. & MARY BiLL RTS. J. 75, 78-84 (1992); Mary C. Mertz Parnell,
Applying Community Standards to International Direct Broadcast Satellites: Can the United States
Know Obscenity Without Seeing It? 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 473, 478-81 (1994); Chiu,
supra note 8, at 189-99; Donovan W. Gaede, Comment, Constitutional Law--Policing the
Obscene: Modern Obscenity Doctrine Re-evaluated, 18 S. ILL. U. LJ. 439, 440-47 (1994);
Goldman, supra note 8, at 1088-98.
'5 See infra Part IA2.
16 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
17 Id. at 568.
18 See i at 558.
19 See id.
20 See id.
21 Id at 559 n.2. See infra Parts IA2.b-c for a discussion of the Court's proliferation of
tests for obscenity.
22 None of the statements cited by the Court in Roth for the proposition that
"this Court has always assumed that obscenity is not protected by the free-
doms of speech and press" were made in the context of a statute punishing
mere private possession of obscene material; the cases cited deal for the
most part with use of the mails to distribute objectionable material or with
some form of public distribution or dissemination. Moreover, none of this
Court's decisions subsequent to Roth involved prosecution for private pos-
session of obscene materials. Those cases dealt with the power of the State
and Federal Governments to prohibit or regulate certain public actions
taken or intended to be taken with respect to obscene matter.
1997] 909
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and its progeny certainly do mean that the First and Fourteenth
Amendments recognize a valid governmental interest in dealing with
the problem of obscenity,"23 he noted that the important government
interest is "in the regulation of commercial distribution of obscene
material"24 and that "the assertion of that interest cannot, in every
context, be insulated from all constitutional protections." 25
Marshall grounded the right to possess obscene materials in pri-
vate on two fundamental constitutional principles-the right to re-
ceive information and the right to privacy:
It is now well established that the Constitution protects the
right to receive information and ideas. "This freedom [of speech
and press] ... necessarily protects the right to receive .... " Martin
v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943). This right to receive
information and ideas, regardless of their social worth, is fundamen-
tal to our free society.... [A] lso fundamental is the right to be free,
except in very limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental
intrusions into one's privacy.2 6
Marshall reasoned that the Constitution included these rights among
its most fundamental principles because they express the most funda-
mental values of our society. The right to receive information and the
right to privacy rest on our aversion to being told what to believe.2 7
Because the Court grounded the protection for private posses-
sion of obscene materials in such basic and fundamental constitu-
tional principles, it would be very difficult for the Court simply to
ignore this protection as it develops obscenity jurisprudence.
Id. at 560-61 (footnote omitted). Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), and its progeny
generally deny constitutional protection to obscene materials. See infra Part IA2.b.
23 Stanky, 394 U.S. at 563.
24 Id. at 563-64.
25 Id. at 563.
26 Id. at 564 (alterations in original) (citations omitted).
27 The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable
to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man's spir-
itual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part
of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material
things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts,
their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the govern-
ment, the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized man.
Id. at 564 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting)).
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no busi-
ness telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read
or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional heritage rebels at the
thought of giving government the power to control men's minds.
... Whatever the power of the state to control public dissemination of
ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot constitutionally premise leg-




In Stanley, the Court rejected three justifications offered by the
state of Georgia in support of its obscenity regulations. In each in-
stance, the Court found the state interest inadequate to challenge the
fundamental right to private possession of obscene materials. First,
Georgia argued, the state has an interest in the morality of its citizens,
which is inconsistent with the possession of obscene materials. 28 The
Court responded that the interest Georgia sought to protect was sim-
ply thought control, which is antithetical to the First Amendment.
2 9
Second, Georgia argued that "exposure to obscene materials may
lead to deviant sexual behavior or crimes of sexual violence." 30 The
Court remarked that there was scant empirical evidence for this prop-
osition, but that more importantly,
if the State is only concerned about printed or filmed materials in-
ducing antisocial conduct, we believe that in the context of private
consumption of ideas and information we should adhere to the view
that "[a] mong free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to
prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the
law .... "
The Court concluded that "the State may no more prohibit the mere
possession of obscene matter on the ground that it may lead to antiso-
cial conduct than it may prohibit possession of chemistry books on the
ground that they may lead to the manufacture of homemade
spirits."3 2
The Court noted that obscene material "might fall into the hands
of children, or that it might intrude upon the sensibilities or privacy of
the general public,"3 3 but concluded that "[n] o such dangers are pres-
28 See id. at 565.
29 Georgia asserts the right to protect the individual's mind from the effects of
obscenity. We are not certain that this argument amounts to anything more
than the assertion that the State has the right to control the moral content
of a person's thoughts. To some, this may be a noble purpose, but it is
wholly inconsistent with the philosophy of the First Amendment. As the
Court said in Kingsley International Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684,
688-689 (1959), -(t)his argument misconceives what it is that the Constitu-
tion protects. Its guarantee is not confined to the expression of ideas that
are conventional or shared by a majority.... And in the realm of ideas it
protects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvinc-
ing."... Nor is it relevant that obscene materials in general, or the particu-
lar films before the Court, are arguably devoid of any ideological
content. ... Whatever the power of the state to control public dissemina-
tion of ideas inimical to the public morality, it cannot constitutionally
premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's private
thoughts.
Id. at 565-66 (alternation in original) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).
30 Id. at 566.
31 Id. at 566-67 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
32 Id. at 567.
33 Id. (citations omitted).
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ent in this case," 3 4 implying that either occurrence would be a "public
action" rather than private possession.
Third, Georgia argued that proving intent to distribute was such a
burden that prohibition of private possession was necessary to make
enforcement of laws against public obscenity offenses possible.35 The
Court responded:
We are not convinced that such difficulties exist, but even if they
did we do not think that they would justify infringement of the indi-
vidual's right to read or observe what he pleases because that right
is so fundamental to our scheme of individual liberty, its restriction
may not be justified by the need to ease the administration of other-
wise valid criminal laws.
3 6
The Court was careful to qualify its conclusion by stating that regula-
tion of obscenity is permissible on the public side of its public/private
distinction. "Roth and the cases following that decision are not im-
paired by today's holding. As we have said, the States retain broad
power to regulate obscenity; that power simply does not extend to
mere possession by the individual in the privacy of his own home."
37
The Court's distinction between the private and public spheres has
influenced the development of obscenityjurisprudence. In order for
the government to regulate obscenity, it must show that the conduct
regulated is in some way public. This aspect of obscenity law is some-
times called the "community contact" requirement.
Although the Court has not wavered in its view of the strength of
the right protected in Stanley, it has narrowed the scope of the right by
drawing the dividing line between private and public conduct at the
doorway of one's own home to give legislators the greatest possible
room to regulate obscenity. The Court has restricted the domain of
privacy to its smallest possible extent, thereby expanding the public
sphere.
38
The Court has held that Stanley does not confer a right to im-
port 9 or to supply obscene materials. 4° Confining exposure to ob-
scene materials to consenting adults is not sufficient to make the
34 Id.
35 See id. at 567.
36 Id. at 567-68.
37 Id.
38 See infra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
39 See United States v. 12 200-foot Reels of Super 8mm Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973).
40 To extrapolate from Stanley's right to have and peruse obscene material in
the privacy of his own home a First Amendment right in Reidel to sell it to
him would effectively scuttle Roth .... Whatever the scope of the 'right to
receive' referred to in Stanley, it is not so broad as to immunize the deal-
ings in obscenity in which Reidel engaged here.
United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 355 (1971).
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context "private."41 The Court has limited the Stanley right of private
possession to the home42 and has denied that a "'zone' of 'privacy'
follows a [possessor] of obscene materials wherever he goes."43 In
United States v. Orito,44 the Court distinguished between private posses-
sion in the home and transportation on "the basis of the natural ten-
dency of material in the home being kept private and the contrary
tendency once material leaves that area, regardless of a transporter's
professed intent."
45
Justice Stevens criticized the narrow interpretation of the right to
possess obscene materials in private, saying that it is "somewhat illogi-
cal [that] a person may be prosecuted.., for providing another with
material he has a constitutional right to possess."
46
The Court's narrow interpretation of the scope of the right to
private possession of obscene materials indicates that the Court has no
interest in expanding protection for obscene materials. At the same
time, the grounding of the right in basic and fundamental constitu-
tional principles makes it unlikely that the Court will overrule Stanley
and withdraw protection from the possession of obscene materials in
one's own home.
Following a discussion of the background of non-protection of
obscene materials in public contexts, Part I.B discusses the tension
between protection of obscene materials in private and non-protec-
tion in public.
47
2. Non-Protection of Obscene Materials in Public
a. Early History of American Obscenity Law
Obscenity prosecutions in the United States at common law date
back at least to 1815.48 States enacted obscenity statutes beginning in
1821, 49 and the federal government followed in 1842.50 New York
enacted the Comstock Act5 ' to fight obscenity in 1868, and the federal
41 See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65-66 (1973) (confining private
context to personal rights that are fundamental or implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty, specifically those of personal intimacy at home, family, marriage, motherhood, pro-
creation, and child-rearing).
42 See id- at 66 (Stanley was decided "on the narrow basis of the 'privacy of the home'
which was hardly more than 'a man's home is his castle.'").
43 Id
44 413 U.S. 139 (1973).
45 Id. at 143.
46 Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 198 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
47 See infra Part I.B.
48 See TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-16, at 906 (citing Commonwealth v. Sharpless, 2 Serg. &
Rawle 91 (1815), as the first reported American obscenity case).
49 See id. (identifying Vermont as the first state to enact an obscenity statute).
50 See id. (identifying ch. 270, 5 Star. 566 (1842) as the first federal obscenity statute).
51 7 New York Stats. 309 (1868).
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government criminalized the use of the mails to distribute obscene
materials in 1873.52 In Regina v. Hicklin,5 3 Lord Chief Justice
Cockburn gave the first enduring definition of obscenity in Anglo-
American law: "whether the tendency of the matter charged... is to
deprave and corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral
influences, and into whose hands a publication of this sort may fall."
54
American courts adopted this definition,55 which in their hands
"came to stand for the double proposition that obscenity was to be
measured by its effect on the most susceptible, and that obscenity of
the work as a whole was to be judged by the effect of isolated
passages."56 The Hicklin standard required courts to exempt the clas-
sics of literature on a case-by-case basis, and resulted in the prohibi-
tion of much contemporary literature.
57
In 1934, the Second Circuit replaced the Hicklin standard in a
widely-followed opinion stating that obscenity should be measured by
the "effect on the average reader of the dominant theme of the work
as a whole."58
b. The Modem Era: The Social Value of Speech
In 1942, the Court articulated a two-level classification 59 of
speech. According to the Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,60 cer-
tain types of speech are not protected because they are "no essential
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly
outweighed by the social interest in order and morality."61 The words
at issue in Chaplinsky were "fighting words," and the Court's analysis
extended to defamation and obscenity as well. 62
In 1957, the Court decided Roth v. United States.63 Justice Bren-
nan announced the Court's test for obscenity: "whether to the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant
52 Ch. 258, 17 Stat. 599 (1873).
53 3 L-R.-Q.B. 360 (1868).
54 TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-16, at 906 (quoting Regina v. Hicklin, 3 L.R.-Q.B. at 368).
55 See id. § 12-16, at 906.
56 Id.
57 See id. at 906-07.
58 Id. at 907 (referring to United States v. One Book Called "Ulysses," 72 F.2d 705 (2d
Cir. 1934)).
59 See id. § 12-18, at 929 and n.2 (attributing the term "tvo-level theory" to Harry
Kalven, Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. Or. RE%. 1; Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 78-79 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Roth rested.., on what has
been termed a two-level approach to the question of obscenity").
60 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
61 Id. at 572.
62 See id.
63 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957) (holding that "obscenity is not within the area of constitu-
tionally protected speech or press.").
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theme of the material takep as a whole appeals to prurient interest."64
In keeping with the reasoning of Chaplinsky, the Court denied consti-
tutional protection to obscene materials on the basis of their lack of
social value:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-
unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the pre-
vailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the guaran-
ties [against abridgement of the freedom of speech and of the
press].... But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the
rejection of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social
importance.
65
The Roth test has been modified several times,6 6 but it is recogniz-
able as the ancestor of our present obscenity standard.
c. Community Standards: National or Local?
The Court had difficulty applying the Roth standard from the
start.67 Two difficulties were interpreting the term "prurient interest,"
and deciding whether the lack of social value of materials was a reason
to prohibit them once they were found obscene or was part of the test
for obscenity.
68
Another question, hotly debated by the Court for sixteen years,
was whether the "community standards" against which allegedly ob-
scene materials were measured were local or national standards. 69 Ad-
64 Id at 489 (listing cases in which lower courts had applied this test).
65 Id at 484.
66 See infra Part IA2.c.
67 See Paris Adult Theatre I v. SIaton, 413 U.S. 49, 79 (1973) (Brennan,J., dissenting)
("[O]ur efforts to implement [the Roth] approach demonstrate that agreement on the
existence of something called 'obscenity' is still a long and painful step from agreement on
a workable definition of the term."). See also Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676,
704-05 (1968) (Harlan,J., separate opinion) (the Court's approach has "produced a variety
of views among the members of the Court unmatched in any other course of constitutional
adjudication.");Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 192-95 (1964) (showing that it is possible
to read Roth in a variety of ways); TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-16, at 909 ("not until 1973 could
any five Justices agree on a definition of 'what constitutes obscene, pornographic material
subject to regulation under the States' police power,'" quoting Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 22 (1973)).
68 See "John Cleland's Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure" v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S.
413, 418 (1966) (holding that obscenity requires three elements conjointly: utter lack of
social value, a dominant theme appealing to the prurient interest in sex when the work is
taken as a whole, and patent offensiveness to the contemporary community standards re-
garding sexual matters); TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-16, at 908-12. These interpretational
matters are not addressed here.
69 There was no majority opinion on this issue until Miller v. Califomia, 413 U.S. 15
(1973), in large part because several Justices did not accept the Roth framework. Justices
Black and Douglas advocated an absolutist interpretation of the First Amendment, see, e.g.,
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 196-97 (1964);Justice Stewart urged a "hard-core pornog-
raphy" standard, see, e.g., id. at 197; andJustice Harlan sought different standards for state
and federal restrictions see, e.g., id. at 203-04.
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vocates of a national standard find the notion repugnant that a
constitutional guarantee of liberty might offer different protection in
different places. 70 Advocates of a local standard respond that it is the
nature of obscenity to be community-relative. 71 On this view, the
guarantee is the same from one community to the next-one may say
whatever one wants as long as it is not obscene-but the allowable
content of one's speech varies by the tolerance of the particular
community. 72
Two prominent plurality opinions called for a national standard.
In Manual Enterprises v. Day,7SJustice Harlan interpreted Roth to incor-
porate a national standard of decency, reasoning that a local standard
would have "the intolerable consequence of denying some sections of
the country access to material, there deemed acceptable, which in
others might be considered offensive to prevailing community stan-
dards of decency."74 In jacobellis v. Ohio,75 Justice Brennan advanced
this position.76 Brennan argued thatJudge Learned Hand first enun-
ciated the concept of "contemporary community standards," 77 and
that by it he meant national standards. 78 Brennan also reasoned that
a local interpretation would not be constitutional-in his words, that
it cannot "properly be employed in delineating the area of expression
that is protected by the Federal Constitution."79 Brennan worried that
without a national standard of obscenity the American people would
suffer a limitation of their First Amendment rights, either at the hands
of their own local governments, or through the limitations of other
local governments in combination with the risk-aversion of
suppliers.8
0
Chief Justice Warren in his dissent urged the adoption of a local
standard,8' arguing that there is "no provable 'national standard,"'
and that because "communities throughout the Nation are in fact di-
70 See infra notes 73-79 and accompanying text.
71 See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
72 See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
73 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
74 Id. at 488.
75 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
76 Id. at 192-95.
77 Id. at 192 (citing United States v. Kennerley, 209 F. 119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913)).
78 See id. at 192-93.
79 Id. at 193.
80 [T]o sustain the suppression of a particular book or film in one locality
would deter its dissemination in other localities where it might be held not
obscene, since sellers and exhibitors would be reluctant to risk criminal
conviction in testing the variation between the two places.... The result
would thus be 'to restrict the public's access to forms of the printed word
which the State could not constitutionally suppress directly.'
Id. at 194 (quoting Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154 (1959)).
81 See id. at 200-01.
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verse," it is natural that material deemed obscene in one community
would be tolerated in others.8 2 The Chief Justice saw the issue as a
balancing of the interests of the community against the rights of indi-
viduals,83 and worried that no nationwide standard could accommo-
date the diversity of local cultures in determining the correct balance.
In 1973, the community standards issue was resolved when five
Justices agreed on a revision of the Roth-Memoirs test which specified a
local community standard. 4 The Miller test is in three parts:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary commu-
nity standards" would find that the work, when taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically de-
fined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
85
The first two prongs are applied using "contemporary community
standards."8 6 Contemporary community standards are those of the fo-
rum community;8 7 there is no national standard of obscenity.88
Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court. He ar-
gued first that a national standard is unmanageable. The ChiefJustice
distinguished "fundamental First Amendment limitations on the pow-
ers of the States,"8 9 which "do not vary from community to commu-
nity,"90 from "standards of... what appeals to the 'prurient interest'
or is 'patently offensive,'"91 which are "essentially questions of fact."9 2
He argued that the pluralistic nature of the Union makes uniform
standards impractical; furthermore, even if the Court could formulate
82 Seei&
83 SeeiL
84 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 29 (1973) ("[T]oday, for the first time since
Roth was decided in 1957, a majority of this Court has agreed on concrete guidelines to
isolate 'hard core' pornography from expression protected by the First Amendment.").
85 Id. at 24 (citations omitted). It deserves mention, but only in passing in the context
of this Note, that the Court explicitly rejected the "'utterly without redeeming social value'
test of Memoirs v. Massachusetts," id, and adopted the "lack[ing] serious literary, artistic,
political, or scientific value" test, id See TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-16, at 908-09.
86 TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-16, at 908; see also Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500
(1987).
87 See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. at 500.
88 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 30-31; Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. at 499. But see
Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1977) (third prong of the Miller test is not to
be evaluated using a local community standard; determination of social value of materials
is made using the reasonable person standard).






a standard which would meet the needs of the whole country, it would
be judicially unmanageable. 93
Chief Justice Burger correctly pointed out that the worry motivat-
ing Justice Brennan's argument in Jacobellis-that local community
standards might prevent distribution of constitutionally allowable
materials through the risk-aversion of suppliers94 -is equally true of
national standards. 95 Unless the national standard were set at the
level of the most tolerant community, it would necessarily prevent dis-
semination of certain materials in some communities that would
otherwise tolerate them.96 A national standard escapes this problem
only if it is maximally permissive, in which case less tolerant communi-
ties are forced to accept materials to which they object. Local commu-
nity standards, on the other hand, enable each community to set its
own tolerance level. The Chief Justice argued that
[i]t is neither realistic nor constitutionally sound to read the First
Amendment as requiring that the people of Maine or Mississippi
accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas, or
New York City.... People in different states vary in their tastes and
attitudes, and this diversity is not to be strangled by the absolutism
of imposed uniformity.97
As long as communities differ in their tolerance for sexually oriented
material, a national standard will impose the standards of some com-
munity upon the rest of the country. A permissive national standard
would force less tolerant communities to accept material they find of-
fensive. A restrictive national standard would prevent tolerant com-
munities from access to materials they would otherwise accept. And
an "average" national standard would do some of each. If Justice
Brennan is correct about the risk-aversion of suppliers of potentially
obscene material, then a local standard will also suppress the distribu-
tion of some constitutionally allowable materials.
Whether one favors a national standard or a local standard de-
pends, among other things, on how one views conflicts between soci-
ety and the individual, how free one thinks speakers ought to be,
93 [O]ur Nation is simply too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably
expect that such standards could be articulated for all 50 States in a single
formulation, even assuming the prerequisite consensus exists. When triers
of fact are asked to decide whether 'the average person, applying contem-
porary community standards' would consider certain materials 'prurient,' it
would be unrealistic to require that the answer be based on some abstract
formulation.... To require a State to structure obscenity proceedings
around evidence of a national 'community standard' would be an exercise
in futility.
Id.
94 See supra notes 73-80 and accompanying text.
95 See MilLer, 413 U.S. at 32-33 n.13.
96 See idL
97 Id. at 32-33.
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whether local or national government is more likely to get it right
when regulating, where the standard might be located in relation to
one's own tolerance, and whether Justice Brennan is right about the
risk-aversion of suppliers of potentially obscene material.
Chief Justice Burger argued that we don't want the most permis-
sive community to set the standard for the whole country, while Jus-
tice Brennan argued that we don't want the most restrictive
community to set the standard for the whole country. Their common
ground seems to be the principle that communities should not have
their standards set by other communities. 98 Because a national stan-
dard cannot honor this principle, the better approach seems to be to
adopt the local community standard, taking whatever steps are possi-
ble to mitigate the risk-aversion of suppliers, and thereby minimizing
the influence of some communities over others.
d. The Rationales for Non-Protection of Obscene Materials in
Public
It is a commonplace in obscenity jurisprudence that the First
Amendment does not protect obscene materials. 99 One of the prem-
ises of this conclusion is that obscene materials lack sufficient social
value to merit protection. 100 The other necessary premise involves the
state interest in restricting the availability of such materials.
In Redrup v. New York,' 0 ' the Court reversed three state court con-
victions because
in none of these cases was there a claim that the statute in question
reflected a specific and limited state concern for juveniles[,] ...
[nor] any suggestion of an assault upon individual privacy by publi-
cation in a manner so obtrusive as to make it impossible for an un-
willing individual to avoid exposure to it[,] ... [nor] evidence of
the sort of "pandering" which the Court found significant in Ginz-
burg v. United States.1
0 2
The Redrup decision suggests that the Court considered a concern for
children, intrusion into the privacy of unconsenting adults, and pre-
vention of public commercialization of sexual materials to be state in-
98 Each Justice seems willing to abandon the principle if, as applied, it will not gener-
ate the results he seeks. This willingness may be based on judgments that errors are not
symmetrical. PerhapsJustice Burger thinks that some over-restriction is-preferable to forc-
ing any community to accept material deemed offensive, and Justice Brennan thinks that
some forcing of communities to accept offensive material is preferable to any over-
restriction.
99 See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 36 (1973) ("[W]e... reaffirm the Roth
holding that obscene material is not protected by the First Amendment... ."); see also supra
Part IA2.b.
100 See supra Part IA2.b.
101 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
102 Id. at 769.
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terests that might justify withholding First Amendment protection.
Finding none of these interests present, the Court held that the
materials in each case were "protected by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments from governmental suppression, whether criminal or
civil, in personam or in rem."1
03
Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton 0 4 is often cited as the first case in
which the Court discussed the state interest in regulating obscene
materials.10 5 Chief Justice Burger identified several substantial state
interests implicating the distribution of obscene materials: (1) expo-
sure of children and unconsenting adults; 106 (2) the quality of public
life and the community environment;10 7 (3) the "tone of commerce
in the great city centers;"'1 8 and (4) "possibly, the public safety it-
self."'1 9 One does not know quite what to make of the "tone of com-
merce" rationale without merging it into the "public life and
community environment" interest. For purposes of the following dis-
cussion this merger is assumed.
ChiefJustice Burger argues that "there is at least an arguable cor-
relation between obscene material and crime."' " 0 This is the very ar-
gument rejected by the Court in Stanley.' But while the Court held
that Stanley's right to possess obscene materials in private was pro-
tected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments, 12 the Court in Paris
concluded that there is no constitutional protection for obscene
materials in the context of public theaters, even if entry is limited to
consenting adults. On this assumption, the state interest need only be
rational for the restriction to survive judicial scrutiny.
Given this assumption, the Court properly concluded that evi-
dence of the correlation between obscene material and crime, though
far from conclusive, was sufficient to find the state interest rational.
But as a justification for denying First Amendment protection to ob-
scene materials in public contexts, the argument begs the question: If
103 Id. at 770 (footnote omitted).
104 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
105 See, e.g., TRinE, supra note 2, § 12-16, at 916-17 and nn.76-79 (in Paris the Court
"undertook for the first time to explain why society could suppress the obscene." Id. at
916). But see supra Part I.A.1, discussing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (rejecting
three state-interest arguments made by the State of Georgia in the context of private pos-
session of obscene materials); Redrup v. N.Y., 386 U.S. 767, 769-70 (1967) (extending First
and Fourteenth Amendment protection to materials that did not implicate state interests
in protecting children, protecting unconsenting adults, or preventing pandering).
106 See Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 57 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-20
(1973)).
107 See id. at 58.
108 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. (footnote omitted).
Ill See supra Part I.A.1.
112 See supra Part IA.1.
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the arguable connection between obscene materials and crime is suffi-
cient ground to regulate obscene materials only if they are not pro-
tected by the First Amendment, then this arguable connection cannot
be used to justify denial of First Amendment protection in the first
place. The non-protection of obscene materials is assumed in the jus-
tification for non-protection.
Pandering, as ajustification for denying First Amendment protec-
tion to obscene materials, suffers from the same defect. In Ginzburg v.
United States,113 the Court indicated that lower courts should consider
commercial exploitation when making obscenity determinations. If
"the purveyor's sole emphasis is on the sexually provocative aspects of
his publications, that fact may be decisive in the determination of ob-
scenity."" 4 A ground for regulating materials based on their alleged
obscenity assumes that obscene materials are not protected, and can-
not well be used to justify denying First Amendment protection to ob-
scene materials.
In support of the "public life and community environment" inter-
est, the Court quoted Professor Alexander Bickel:
[The problem of obscenity] concerns the tone of the society, the
mode, or to use the terms that have perhaps greater currency, the
style and quality of life, now and in the future.... [If a man] de-
mands a right to obtain the books and pictures he wants in the mar-
ket, and to foregather in public places-discreet, if you will, but
accessible to all-with others who share his tastes, then to grant him
this right is to affect the world about the rest of us, and to impinge
on other privacies.... [W]hat is commonly read and seen and
heard and done intrudes upon us all, want it or not.
115
The Court assumed that when obscene materials intrude into the day-
to-day lives of the population at large, they invade privacy interests
and can be regulated." 6 Further, the Court adopted Professor
Bickel's argument that even discreet public exposure constitutes this
sort of invasion. This justification rests the "public life and commu-
nity environment" interest on the "exposure to unconsenting adults"
interest.
Thus, the bedrock of rationales for withholding First Amendment
protection from obscene materials is exposure of unconsenting adults
and of children. Even Justice Brennan, who by 1973 had concluded
113 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
114 Id. at 470. See also Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 130 (1974); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495-96 (1957) (Warren, CJ., concurring).
115 Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 59 (quoting Alexander Bickel, On Pornography:
Dissenting and Concuring Opinions, 22 PuBLcC INTEREsr 25, 25-26 (Winter 1971)).
116 This argument features prominently in the Court's determination that broadcast-
ing deserves only the lowest First Amendment protection and that cable transmissions and
"dial-a-porn" should be distinguished from broadcasting. See infra Parts II.G-D.
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that obscene materials should receive First Amendment protection," 7
reserved the possibility that regulation might properly be premised on
this rationale: "I would hold ... that at least in the absence of distri-
bution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults, the
First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal
Governments from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented
materials on the basis of their allegedly 'obscene' contents.""
8
Although the Court explains exposure of unconsenting adults as
an intrusion or an invasion of protected privacy," 9 the "exposure of
children" rationale does not receive much explication in the Court's
opinions. In Ginsberg v. New York, 120 the Court held that "[t]he well-
being of its children is of course a subject within the State's constitu-
tional power to regulate,"121 and that "the State has an interest 'to
protect the welfare of children' and to see that they are 'safeguarded
from abuses' which might prevent their 'growth into free and in-
dependent well-developed men and citizens.'"122 The Court found
two grounds for this interest. First, the authority of parents in their
own households "is basic in the structure of our society,' 23 and they
"are entitled to the support of laws designed to aid discharge of that
responsibility."124 Second, "[t] he State has an independent interest in
the well-being of its youth."'1 2 5 The Jacobellis Court "recognize[d] the
legitimate and indeed exigent interest of States and localities through-
out the Nation in dissemination of material deemed harmful to chil-
dren," 26 without further comment. In FCC v. Pacifica,127 the Court
repeated Ginsberg's parental authority language.
128
The facilitation of parental responsibility seems too weak a
ground to justify denial of First Amendment protection to a class of
speech, and the only other justification offered by the Court is a na-
ked assertion. The lack of further explication is probably due to the
117 See Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 103, 112-13 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
118 Id. at 113 (Brennan, J., dissenting). But note that Brennan would not extend the
rationale to include remote "exposure," requiring that exposure be "obtrusive." See id. at
106-07 (exhibition of films to consenting adults does not implicate the state interest in
protecting minors or unconsenting adults); see also Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 513
(1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("government may not constitutionally criminalize mere
possession or sale of obscene literature, absent some connection to minors or obtrusive
display to unconsenting adults").
119 The Court has held that in at least some circumstances people have a duty to
"avert[ ] their eyes." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971).
120 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
121 Id. at 639.
122 Id. at 640-41 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944)).
123 Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 639.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 640.
126 Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964).
127 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
128 See id. at 749.
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Court thinking that the state interest in protecting children really
does go without saying. One way to look at the interest in protecting
children is to consider it as the same sort of protected privacy interest
that unconsenting adults have, asserted paternalistically by the state.
Assuming that the state- has a compelling interest in protecting
children from obscene materials, what sort of restrictions on obscene
material might itjustify? The Court held in Butler v. Michigan129 that
the state interest in protecting children from exposure to harmful ma-
terial did not justify total suppression of the material, which would
"reduce the adult population ... to reading only what is fit for chil-
dren." 30 As Justice Frankfurter put it, "[s]urely this is to burn the
house to roast the pig."13' The Jacobellis Court reiterated this point
immediately following its recognition of the state interest in protect-
ing children from exposure to harmful materials, 3 2 quoting Butler.3 3
This Part has examined four rationales offered by the Court for
denying First Amendment protection to obscene materials in a public
context: public safety, pandering, public life and the community envi-
ronment, and the exposure of unconsenting adults and children.134
The Court's arguments in favor of public safety and pandering, as ra-
tionales for denying First Amendment protection to obscene materi-
als, fail for circularity.' 35 The argument for public life and the
community environment as a rationale for denying First Amendment
protection to obscene materials collapses, this rationale into the expo-
sure-of-unconsenting-adults-and-children rationale. 136 It is thus no
surprise that the Court ultimately relies on this rationale as the pri-
mary justification for denying First Amendment protection to obscene
materials in public contexts. Finally, although these are strong state
interests, they have limitations. Regulations intended to protect chil-
dren must be narrowly drawn so as not to infringe upon the rights of
adults, and means of distribution that do not intrude upon the privacy
of unconsenting adults may not be "public" at all. Although the Court
has interpreted these limitations narrowly, they are nevertheless
limitations.
B. First Amendment Issues Presented by On-Line Obscenity
The previous Parts have established several principles of law ar-
ticulated by the Court in its decisions. First, there is a right to possess
129 352 U.S. 380 (1957).
130 Id. at 383.
11 Id.
132 See supra text accompanying note 126.
133 378 U.S. at 195.
134 See supra notes 101-33 and accompanying text.
135 See supra notes 112-14 and accompanying text.
136 See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
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obscene materials in private. Second, this right to private possession
is a privacy right protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Third, obscene materials in public contexts are not protected by the
First and Fourteenth Amendments. Fourth, the reason that obscene
materials are not protected in public is that they intrude upon the
privacy rights of unconsenting adults and risk harm to children who
might be exposed to them. Fifth, communities should not have their
standards set by other communities. Sixth, obscenity is determined
according to the Miller test, which requires for a finding of obscenity
that an average person applying contemporary community standards
would find that the work, taken as a whole, both appeals to the pruri-
ent interest and is a patently offensive depiction of sexual conduct. 3 7
And seventh, the community standards to be applied under the Miller
test are those of the local community.
There is a tension between the principle that obscene materials
should be protected in some contexts and the principle that they
should not be protected in other contexts. This Note explicates this
tension as a conflict between the privacy rights of people who would
view obscene material and the privacy rights of those who would pre-
vent their own, and their children's, exposure to it.138 Because each is
a protected right, neither can simply eclipse the other. The judicial
task is to draw a line between the two protected rights. The Court has
drawn this line using a public/private distinction, and has interpreted
the distinction to expand the right of those who might be unwillingly
exposed, and to contract the right of the willing viewer.
The Court's opinions have put a heavy dialectical load on the
public/private distinction, and the strain shows in the difficulty the
Court has had in plausibly justifying the degree to which the one right
has been contracted and the other expanded. This strain is especially
acute in cases in which the risk of public contact with the obscene
materials is minimal. Computer-mediated communications present
cases that threaten to tax this strained justification beyond its ability to
cope.
United States v. Thomas 3 9 is the most visible (and perhaps the
first) ' 4 0 on-line obscenity case tried to date, and it raises many of the
137 These are necessary, but not sufficient conditions for a finding of obscenity. For
the complete Mi//er test, see supra Part I.A.2.c.
138 A driving force in the obscenity wars is, of course, the desire of some to enforce a
public morality by denying to people who would view obscene material the ability to do so,
not because of harm to the prohibitionist, but for the willing viewer's own good. The
Court has rejected this rationale for censorship. See supra Part IA.1.
139 No. CR-94-20019-G (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 13, 1994), affd, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 74 (1996).
140 See, e.g., R. Timothy Muth, Old Doctrines On a New Frontier: Defamation and Jurisdic-
tion in Cyberspace, 68 Wis. LAw. 10, 56 (1995) (Thomas is "believed to be the first prosecution
under [18 U.S.C. § 1465] against the operator of a computer bulletin board"); Faucette,
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issues that prove troublesome for the existing conceptual and legal
approaches to obscenity law. Robert and Carleen Thomas operated
the Amateur Action BBS141 from their home in Milpitas, California.
Amateur Action, a "members only" bulletin board system, 142 stored a
large collection 43 of sexually explicit pictures' 44 that members could
download to their own computers. 145 A postal inspectorjoined Ama-
teur Action, downloaded pictures in Memphis, and initiated the pros-
ecution of the Thomases in the Western District of Tennessee. 146 The
Thomases were unsuccessful in their attempt to transfer the case to
the Northern District of California. 47 The Memphis jury, applying
Memphis community standards, convicted the Thomases of violating
federal obscenity statutes,' 48 including six counts of using "a facility
and means of interstate commerce, that is a combined computer/tele-
supra note 8, at 1168 (referring to Thomas as "[t]he first successful prosecution for com-
puter-transmitted images"); Pamela A. Huelster, Note, Cybersex and Community Standards, 75
B.U. L. RE. 865, 866 (1995) ("This was the first obscenity case in which authorities prose-
cuted the operators of a computer service using the community standards of the transmis-
sion recipient, rather than those of the originator"); First Conviction for Obscenity on the
Internet, 11 COMPUTER LAw., Sept. 1994, at 29 (referring to Thomas as "reportedly the first-
ever federal conviction for transmitting obscenity through the Internet") (note that Ama-
teur Action was a dial-in BBS not connected to the Internet).
141 Bulletin board system. A computer bulletin board is the electronic counterpart to
the familiar cork board. Just as with cork boards, some BBSs allow users to post messages,
and some restrict posting privileges to the system operator (sysop). Some differences in
the legal issues that arise are related to this distinction. For example, a restricted-posting
BBS is in some ways similar to a magazine, where the sysop is the publisher. An un-
restricted posting BBS, on the other hand, is in some ways similar to a semi-public or
public cork board (depending on whether one needs to be a subscriber to read and post or
whether the BBS is available to everybody) or to a bookstore. Whether the law holds the
sysop liable for damages caused by postings (such as defamation and copyright infringe-
ment), and whether it allows the sysop to regulate the content of the BBS, may turn on this
distinction.
142 Members-only BBSs require a password for access. The sysop may charge for ac-
cess, for connect time, and/or for downloads. Many adult BBS operators require potential
members to provide proof of age, such as a driver's license, and to state that they are over
21 and know that they are requesting sexually explicit material. See Huelster, supra note
140, at 885.
143 Approximately 17,000 images were available to subscribers. See Byassee, supra note
5, at 204 n.35.
144 The materials on the Amateur Action BBS were presumably not obscene by
Milpitas community standards. Local police confiscated the Thomases' computer two
years before the federal indictment, but returned it saying that the material was not ob-
scene. See Grosso, supra note "-', at 484.
145 See David Landis, Sex, Laws and Cyberspace; Regulating Porn: Does it Compute?, USA
TODAY, Aug. 9, 1994, at ID, 2D.
146 Affidavit in Support of Search Warrant, submitted by Inspector Dirmeyer, Thomas
(No. CR-94-20019-G).
147 Order Denying Motion for Transfer, Thomas (No. CR-94-20019-G).
148 See Couple Guilty of Sending Pornography by Computer, L.A. TiMEs, July 29, 1994, at A10;
Landis, supra note 145, at 15; Two Convicted in Computer Pornography Case, N.Y. TIMEs, July
29, 1994, at B7.
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phone system, for the purpose of transporting obscene material in
interstate commerce" 149 in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1465.150
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 151 The substantive issues
considered by the Sixth Circuit were the intangibility of the material,
venue, and choice of community standards. 152 The court held that
the intangibility issue was decided by congressional intent to prevent
the Thomases' conduct,155 notwithstanding the absence of statutory
149 Indictment, Counts 2-7, Thomas (No. CR-94-20019-G).
150 The statute provides in relevant part that:
Whoever knowingly transports in interstate or foreign commerce for the
purpose of sale or distribution ... any obscene, lewd, lascivious, or filthy
book, pamphlet, picture, film, paper, letter, writing, print, silhouette, draw-
ing, figure, image, cast, phonograph recording, electrical transcription or
other article capable of producing sound or any other matter of indecent
or immoral character, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not
more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1994).
The recently-enacted Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit.
V, §§ 501-61, 110 Stat. 56, 133-43, has amended this section of the statute:
TRANSPORTATION FOR PURPOSES OF SALE OR DISTRIBUTION.
The first undesignated paragraph of section 1465 of titie 18, United States
Code, is amended-(1) by striking "transports in" and inserting "transports
or travels in, or uses a facility or means of,"; (2) by inserting "or an interac-
tive computer service (as defined in section 230(e) (2) of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934) in or affecting such commerce" after "foreign
commerce" the first place it appears; (3) by striking ", or knowingly travels
in" and all that follows through "obscene material in interstate or foreign
commerce," and inserting "of."
Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. V, § 507, 110 Stat. 56, 137 (1996).
This amendment alters the above-quoted portion of § 1465 to read:
Whoever knowingly transports or travels in, or uses a facility or means of,
interstate or foreign commerce or an interactive computer service (as de-
fined in section 230(e) (2) of the Communications Act of 1934) in or affect-
ing such commerce for the purpose of sale or distribution of any obscene,
lewd, lascivious, or filthy book, pamphlet, picture, film, paper, letter, writ-
ing, print, silhouette, drawing, figure, image, cast, phonograph recording,
electrical transcription or other article capable of producing sound or any
other matter of indecent or immoral character, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1465 (West Supp. 1997). The A.C.LU. and other plaintiffs have challenged
the constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act of 1996. See ACLU v. Reno, 929
F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), cert. granted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3414 (U.S. Dec. 6, 1996) (No. 96-
511); Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3362 (U.S. Oct.
15, 1996) (No. 96-595). The challenge reached the Supreme Court on March 19, 1996, see
Linda Greenhouse, Spirited Debate in High Court On Decency Rules for Internet, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 20, 1997, at B10, thanks to the expedited review provision of the Act. See Pub. L. No.
104-104, tit. V, § 561. 110 Stat. 56, 142-43 (1996).
151 United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1774 (1996).
152 See id. at 707, 709-12. The procedural issues addressed by the court were the jury
instructions, expert testimony concerning the "prurient interest" of the materials, the ad-
mission of uncharged evidence, denial of effective assistance of counsel, and reduction of
the Thomases' sentences under the sentencing guidelines. See id. at 712-16.
153 See id. at 707 (citing United States v. Gilboe, 684 F.2d 235 (2d Cir. 1982), for the
proposition that electronic signals are merely the means by which money is transferred and
concluding that wire funds transfers are "transportation" of money). But Gilboe is distin-
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language dealing with computer-transmitted materials. 54 On the
venue challenge, the court held that precedent in the Sixth 55 and
Eleventh 56 Circuits establishes violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1465 as a "con-
tinuing offense" under the venue provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3237, al-
lowing prosecution "in any district from, through, or into which" the
material travels. 157 As part of its venue analysis, the court considered
whether the Thomases knew that material from their bulletin board
went to Memphis.'-5  The court held that on the facts of this case, the
application process' 59 put the Thomases on notice that they were
sending material to Memphis.
160
If courts read Thomas narrowly, it may not apply to a case arising
on the Internet and involving a no-membership WWW or FTP site.
On the other hand, courts may read Thomas broadly for the proposi-
tion that on-line providers are liable in any community where their
materials can be downloaded.
The decision in Thomas is troubling for four reasons. First, even
if the decision is limited to its narrow holding, liability in the receiving
community will be imposed upon careful on-line providers who try to
prevent exposure to unconsenting adults and children, but not upon
providers who remain intentionally ignorant. 16' Second, an on-line
supplier of potentially obscene material may not know, or have the
guishable. The electronic funds transfer is a "zero-sum" transaction-the money disap-
pears from one location and reappears in another. In the usual downloading situation, the
original remains on the supplier's computer.
154 See supra note 150 regarding recent amendments to the statute.
155 See United States v. Beddow, 957 F.2d 1330, 1335 (6th Cir. 1992) ("[v]enue lies in
any district in which the offense was committed,") (quoting United States v. Williams, 788
F.2d 1213, 1215 (6th Cir. 1986)); see also United States v. Peraino, 645 F.2d 548, 551 (6th
Cir. 1981) ("venue for federal obscenity prosecutions lies 'in any district from, through, or
into which' the allegedly obscene material moves") (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3237 (1988)).
156 See United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 830 (11 th Cir. 1982) ("there is no consti-
tutional impediment to the government's power to prosecute pornography dealers in any
district into which the material is sent") (holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1465 defines the prohib-
ited conduct as a "continuing offense" for purposes of the 18 U.S.C. § 3237 venue
provisions).
157 See supra notes 155-56.
158 See Thomas, 74 F.3d at 709-10. See infra Part III.C for a discussion of the scienter
requirement for obscenity prosecutions.
159 See Thomas, 74 F.3d at 705 (application form with name, address, telephone
number, and signature was required to join; Robert Thomas had conversed with Inspector
Dirmeyer at his Memphis telephone number).
160 See id. at 709-10.
161 This result is similar to the recent counterintuitive state of on-line defamation law.
On-line providers who exercise no editorial control over the contents of their services are
treated like "secondary publishers" and are not liable for defamatory contents, see Cubby
Inc. v. CompuServe, 776 F. Supp. 135 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), while providers who try to police
their content are treated as publishers and are held liable, see Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v.
Prodigy Services, 1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. C. May 24, 1995).
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ability to know, the destination of files downloaded from his server. 162
This consideration implicates the scienter requirement of criminal
law. Third, if on-line providers are subject to prosecution in the recip-
ient's community, the material available on-line will be restricted to
that which is acceptable in the least tolerant community. All commu-
nities will have their standards set by the least tolerant community, in
violation of the fundamental principle that communities should set
their own standards. Fourth, the recipient's right to possess obscene
materials in private will be restricted even though there is no risk to
the countervailing privacy interests of unconsenting adults and chil-
dren. The Court's public/private distinction cannot plausibly stretch
its justifying principles this far.
The Thomas decision indicates that the Western District of Ten-
nessee implicitly or explicitly conceptualized the transactions charged
in counts two to seven as sendings analogous to mailings. This postal
paradigm is an inappropriate analogy for the most common cases of
on-line transfers of potentially obscene material, downloading by will-
ing viewers.
II
Is A NEw LEGAL PARADIGM NECESSARY?
On-line obscenity prosecutions raise two basic First Amendment
questions. First, which is the proper community by whose standards
to judge on-line obscenity? And second, how should the law concep-
tualize on-line transactions? One's answer to the first question de-
pends upon one's answer to the second.
A third question is sometimes asked: How should the law concep-
tualize the on-line environment? Those who ask this question gener-
ally claim that no existing legal conceptualization or paradigm is up to
the task of deciding cases in the on-line environment, and that conse-
quently a new conceptualization is necessary. This view suffers from
the very defect it identifies in the existing paradigms. Because the on-
line environment is so diverse, no single paradigm can apply to the
whole environment and all the transactions that occur within it. Some
on-line actors resemble common carriers, some resemble publishers,
and others resemble bookstores, readers, handbillers, or soapbox
preachers. Furthermore, a single actor may resemble a common car-
162 See infra Part IV; Byassee, supra note 5, at 211 ("[a]lthough the BBS operator may
set his equipment to allow [automatic downloads], and is aware that out-of-state subscrib-
ers are likely to download various files, a fundamental distinction exists between this pre-
paratory activity and the affirmative action of initiating the actual transportation");
Huelster, supra note 140, at 870 (operator of on-line service "maintains no control over the
destination of the information"); Symposium, First Amendment and the Media, supra note 8,
at 254 (on-line supplier cannot decide where to distribute materials).
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rier with respect to some of its on-line transactions, and a publisher or
a bookstore with respect to others. Although those who call for a new
conceptualization of the on-line environment are correct to claim that
no existing legal paradigm can adequately frame all the conflicts that
will arise on-line, they are incorrect to think that any single paradigm
is up to the task. No single paradigm can even adequately account for
all on-line transfers of potentially obscene material.
This Note suggests a transactional approach instead. A court us-
ing this method inquires into the character of the particular transac-
tion and uses the legal paradigm appropriate to this character. It may
be that some possible on-line transactions cannot successfully be char-
acterized according to existing paradigms. In these cases, courts will
need to develop new conceptualizations. But on-line transfers of po-
tentially obscene material by willing viewers are not such cases. They
are properly analogized to cases where the recipient travels to the sup-
plier's location and returns home with the material.
This Part, then, focuses on the question of what legal paradigm
courts should apply at the transactional level to computer-mediated
transfers of potentially obscene material to willing viewers.
Courts have several conceptualizations available within which to
try to fit on-line obscenity cases. They can analogize the on-line trans-
fer of allegedly obscene material to sending such material through the
mail, distributing it in magazines, broadcasting it, cablecasting it, com-
municating it by telephone, and posting it in public places. On-line
transfers share certain characteristics with each of these existing meth-
ods of conveying potentially obscene material. The similarities invite
lawyers, judges, and legal academics to apply the existing law gov-
erning these methods of conveyance to cases arising in the on-line
context. The differences between on-line transfers to willing viewers
and each of the conventional methods of distribution are sufficiently
great that the result of such a project would be malformed and uncer-
tain law and incorrect decisions. 163 The conceptual frameworks upon
which the law governing the conventional methods of distribution are
based are not apt characterizations of this kind of on-line transaction.
First, Parts II.A-D examine computer-mediated transfers of poten-
tially obscene material through several conceptualizations now avail-
able in American law, which have been suggested as appropriate
paradigms for deciding on-line obscenity cases. It concludes that
163 Note that incorrect decisions are possible both in the on-line cases themselves,
which may be assimilated only poorly into an existing area of law, and in conventional
cases once the law has been adjusted to include on-line cases. Future broadcasting cases
that would be correctly decided under broadcasting law as it has developed, for example,




there are serious objections to each of them. Next, Part II.E examines
several conceptualizations that have recently been advanced for decid-
ing on-line obscenity cases, and which are not currently available in
American law, concluding again that there are serious objections to
each of them. Finally, Part II.F identifies another conceptual frame-
work currently available in American law, though rarely suggested as
an analogy appropriate for on-line obscenity cases. 1' Part III argues
(1) that this paradigm is an apt characterization of on-line transfers of
allegedly obscene materials to willing viewers, and (2) that this con-
ceptual framework is, among the surveyed alternatives, uniquely in
harmony with the legal principles underlying existing obscenity law,
in particular the protection afforded to private possession of obscene
materials by Stanley v. Georgia165 and the principle that communities
should set their own standards.
A. The Postal Paradigm
Many early obscenity prosecutions involved the sending of poten-
tially obscene material through the mail. As obscenity jurisprudence
developed, it was natural to apply the law created in the postal context
to sendings generally. The postal paradigm is implicit in the Thomas
decision. But the analogy fails when it is applied to the usual sort of
on-line transactions.
The postal paradigm can be characterized by three criteria. First,
there is an identifiable sender who acts affirmatively to transport ma-
terial to a particular recipient. Second, the sender is aware of the
identity and location of the recipient. Third, the material is entrusted
to a third party for transportation.1 66 All three criteria distinguish
postal transactions from on-line transfers.
The first criterion does not apply to file servers in general. Serv-
ers do not initiate transfers or act affirmatively with intent. They re-
spond automatically to requests for data. 167 It might be argued that
the server does what it is programmed to do, and that the intent and
affirmative action of the owner of the server 168 are reflected in its pro-
164 See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
165 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
166 A fourth criterion was, originally, that the third party (i.e., the Post Office) had a
special relationship with the government. Early federal obscenity statutes were based on
the postal power. As obscenity law developed, the identity of the transporting agent be-
came less important. The third party now need not have a special relationship with the
government. Current federal law criminalizes transportation of obscene materials. See 18
U.S.C. § 1465 (1994). If such provisions are considered to be within the postal paradigm,
then the third-party criterion is also not part of the paradigm as it exists today.
167 See Byassee, supra note 5, at 211 (noting that BBSs accept calls and send files auto-
matically, without the "intervention, presence, or knowledge of the BBS operator").
168 For simplicity this account assumes that the server owner is the sender of the mate-
rial. In the Thomases' case this is largely true. Robert Thomas organized the image files
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gramming. Furthermore, one could argue that the mail-order
merchant is responding to the request of the recipient just as the
server is. Accepting this as true, still, the intent and affirmative action
demonstrated in the case of the server are not directed towards trans-
porting material to a particular recipient. 169 The mail-order
merchant can choose not to send material to a certain individual or
into a certain community, but the server owner cannot make this
choice.' 70 Judged by the server owner's intent and action, the server
is more closely analogous to a walk-in bookstore than to a catalog
merchant.' 7 ' Furthermore, the server owner is often not in a position
to know the identity or the location of the recipient. A World Wide
Web (WWW) or anonymous File Transfer Protocol (FTP) site on the
Internet, for example, may have difficulty even knowing whether a
particular contact originates within the United States.172 Even a mem-
bers-only BBS with a strict application and verification process knows
only the identity of the recipient. Once a password is issued, it can be
used from anywhere. Finally, it is not clear that the material is en-
trusted to a third party for transport in the on-line context. 7 3
B. The Print Paradigm
The characterizing criteria for the publishing paradigm are (1)
editorial control over the material and (2) control over the geo-
graphic extent of distribution. The first criterion is not present in
some on-line transfers of potentially obscene material to willing recipi-
ents. Many BBSs and newsgroups, for example, allow postings by any
user.174 The more telling distinction is the second. Publishers can
tailor material for different communities, and can avoid sending mate-
and created labels for them on a dial-up server which the Thomases owned. Most Internet
content providers do not own their own servers, however. They rent storage space on a
server owned by an Internet access provider. And some "content providers" merely pro-
vide storage for material uploaded by other users. Determining who the sender is for
purposes of criminal liability in these cases is not trivial.
169 See Byassee, supra note 5, at 211 (arguing that "a fundamental distinction exists




172 The Massachusetts Institute of Technology FTP server, from which one can
download PGP encryption software, denies access from non-U.S. addresses because the
encryption algorithm is not approved for export by the State Department. The determina-
tion is made according to the Internet address of the party who wishes to download, and
the server denies access to so many U.S. addresses that the access instructions state the
procedure for requesting manual intervention.
173 This criterion may not be part of the postal paradigm as it exists today. See supra
note 166 and accompanying text.
174 Of course, the posting user might be considered a publisher in these cases.
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rial into communities where the risk is high that it would be judged
obscene. On-line suppliers do not have this ability:
A conventional publisher can decide where to distribute his materi-
als, and if the materials include sexual matter, he can avoid commu-
nities where the standards are less tolerant. By definition, materials
that are distributed through cyberspace cannot be limited in the
same way. Thus, in this context, there is a fundamental difference in
the nature of the medium.175
C. The Broadcasting and Dial-a-Porn Paradigms
176
Broadcasting receives "the lowest level of First Amendment pro-
tection"'7 7 because it is a "uniquely pervasive presence" in American
life.'7 8 In essence, broadcasting is per se public by virtue of its ines-
capably intrusive nature. This intrusive nature is the characterizing
criterion for the broadcast paradigm.
In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,79 the. Court emphasized the nar-
rowness of its holding: "This case does not involve a two-way radio
conversation between a cab driver and a dispatcher. .. ."180 The ques-
tion is where the "per se public" line should be drawn between the
privacy rights of willing recipients and those of unconsenting adults
and children. The Court has considered the boundary between intru-
sion and protection in "dial-a-porn" cases. In Sable v. FCC,'8' a dial-a-
porn service challenged the 1988 amendments to 47 U.S.C. § 223(b),
which imposed a ban on indecent and obscene commercial interstate
telephone communications. The Court distinguished dial-a-porn
from broadcasting, holding that telephone messages are not pervasive
in virtue of the affirmative action of the recipient:
The Pacifica opinion . . . relied on the "unique" attributes of
broadcasting, noting that broadcasting is "uniquely pervasive," can
intrude on the privacr of the home without warning as to program
content, and is "uniquely accessible to children, even those too
young to read." The private commercial telephone communica-
tions at issue here are substantially different from the public radio
broadcast at issue in Pacifica. In contrast to public displays, unsolic-
ited mailings and other means of expression which the recipient has
no meaningful opportunity to avoid, the dial-it medium requires
175 Symposium, First Amendment and the Media, supra note 8, at 254.
176 Note that broadcasting cases involve indecent communications or materials, not
obscene materials. The per se public, intrusive nature of broadcasting resolves the
obscenity question in favor of the privacy rights of unconsenting adults and children.
177 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
178 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978). Other factors include the
public ownership of a scarce resource, viz. the airwaves.
179 Id.
180 Id. at 750.
181 Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
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the listener to take affirmative steps to receive the communication.
There is no "captive audience" problem here; callers will generally
not be unwilling listeners. The context of dial-in services, where a
caller seeks and is willing to pay for the communication, is mani-
festly different from a situation in which a listener does not want the
received message. Placing a telephone call is not the same as turn-
ing on a radio and being taken by surprise by an indecent
message.... [T]he message received by one who places a call to a
dial-a-porn service is not so invasive or surprising that it prevents an
unwilling listener from avoiding exposure to it.
18 2
Although the Court upheld the "obscene communications" provi-
sion of the statute, 83 the logic the Court used suffers from the same
circularity discussed in Part I.A.2.d. If dial-a-porn is not public, which
the Court found, then even obscene messages should be protected
because the criterion for protection is the public/private distinction.
The Court's holding could be defended by a distinction of de-
gree: On this view, dial-a-porn is "private" enough that indecency is
protected, but "public" enough that obscenity is not. Alternatively,
one might claim that the Court's view is that dial-a-porn is private but
for the pandering that accompanies its commercialization.
On either view, willing viewers downloading potentially obscene
materials on-line can be distinguished from obscene dial-a-porn. First,
the on-line context is substantially more private than the telephone
context. If an unconsenting listener came across dial-a-porn by acci-
dent-for example, by misdialing or through crosswiring by the
phone company"-the message would be immediately intelligible and
offensive. If, on the other hand, an unconsenting viewer were ac-
cidently sent potentially obscene materials on-line, all he would have
is a computer file which would still require affirmative action and
proper decoding software to view. Recognizing the file as misdi-
rected, the potential viewer need only discard it without viewing it.
On the second view, only commercially pandered materials on-line
would be considered public.
D. The Public Posting Paradigm
Another means of distributing potentially obscene material
would be to post it publicly. Ex hypothesi, the characteristic of this
method is its public nature. The paradigm is mentioned here because
the pre-analytic notion of a computer bulletin board system might
suggest public posting as a viable paradigm.
182 Id. at 127-28 (striking the "indecent communications" provisions of 47 U.S.C.
§ 223(b) (1988)).




The Court has held that commercial speech using the advertising
space on bus walls has a similar "captive audience" problem to broad-
casting.'8 4 There is every reason to believe that the Court would find
public posting similarly intrusive into the privacy of unconsenting
adults. For the reasons discussed in Parts III.A and III.C, willing view-
ers downloading potentially obscene materials from on-line sources
do not conform to this paradigm.
E. Paradigms Not Currently Available in American Law
1. National Obscenity Standard
The increase in on-line activity has focused attention on First
Amendment issues in the on-line context. Some commentators have
responded to the controversy over potentially obscene materials on-
line by advocating a national obscenity standard for on-line speech. 18 5
This approach is not currently available since Miller and its prog-
eny specified the local community standard.18 6 However. the local
standards decisions were announced over twenty years ago by bare ma-
jorities of the Court. Perhaps the issue should be reopened. This Part
argues that a national standard is both undesirable and unlikely.
Part I.A.2.c notes that jurists of opposing ideologies seem to agree
on the principle that communities should not have their standards
dictated by other communities. Furthermore, as long as community
standards are heterogeneous across the country, no single standard
can avoid violating this principle. Therefore, as a matter of principle,
jurists should prefer local standards.
But obscenity is not merely a legal issue; it is a political issue as
well. Perhaps legislators could impose a national standard. 8 7 This is
unlikely, because legislators will not support a national standard un-
less it draws the line near where they think it ought to be. The same
heterogeneity that makes a national standard a bad idea in principle
also makes it an unlikely political solution.
184 See TRIBE, supra note 2, § 12-19, at 949 n.24. But see Cohen v. California, 403 U.S.
15 (1971) (holding that in the case of political speech consisting of the words "Fuck the
Draft" emblazoned on a jacket, unconsenting viewers had a duty to avert their eyes).
185 See, e.g., Symposium, First Amendment and the Media, supra note 8, at 254 (advocating
either a national obscenity standard or the use of the "cyber-community" for community
standards analysis); Chiu, supra note 8, at 189 (advocating a national obscenity standard);
Goldman, supra note 8, at 1104-05 (arguing that "[d]ropping the 'community standards'
prong of the Miller test seems the obvious solution for a medium such as the Internet");
Kim, supra note 8, at 430, 441 (suggesting, inter alia. either a national obscenity standard
or a national per se obscenity rule).
186 See supra Part IA2.c.
187 If they did, the Court might still find that the principle that communities should
not have their standards dictated by other communities has constitutional dimensions.
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2. Virtual Community Standard
Perhaps the most interesting suggestion in the on-line obscenity
debate is the idea that the appropriate community for community
standards analysis is the cyber-community itself.'88 This notion is the
strong cyber-community thesis.' 89
The idea is that on-line computer users form a sufficiently robust
community to be recognized by the law, at least for purposes of the
Miller obscenity analysis. There is a certain plausibility to this claim
that would be lacking in an analogous claim made by magazine read-
ers, broadcast listeners, cable subscribers, postal customers, telephone
users, or handbillers. This plausibility is a result of the inherent pri-
vacy of the user/computer relationship. This privacy isolates the com-
puter user from his or her geographic community, and imparts a
feeling of participation in a self-sufficient on-line community. This
Part argues that the privacy of the user/computer relationship is insuf-
ficient to establish the strong cyber-community thesis. Part III argues
that it is sufficient at least to limit the liability of on-line suppliers of
potentially obscene material to their own geographical communities.
The first difficulty with the strong cyber-community thesis is that
it asks us to consider the computer user as no longer a part of his or
her geographic community while on-line. The intuitive plausibility of
the cyber-community thesis is grounded in the fact that the user is
withdrawn from his or her geographic community while on-line; but
withdrawal falls short of absence, and the strong cyber-community the-
orist needs the user's absence from his or her geographic community
to motivate the theory. If the user remains part of his or her geo-
graphic community while on-line, the strong cyber-community theo-
rist has not shown that the user's geographic community is an
improper venue for prosecution.
The second difficulty isjustifying the scope of the on-line commu-
nity. Some on-line users use e-mail exclusively; others use commercial
188 See, e.g., Branscomb, supra note 8, at 1652-54 (asserting the independence of the
"virtual community" of computer-mediated communicators from geographical communi-
ties and arguing that the virtual community's standards should govern an obscenity analy-
sis, at least where no harmful consequences can be demonstrated in a geographical
community); Byassee, supra note 5, at 210 ("the computer user's interaction transcends the
local community because that user, from the privacy of her own home, is participating in a
community for which geographical bounds are irrelevant. The physical conduct of using
the computer-of connecting to cyberspace-may occur in a physical location, but that is
not the conduct to which the community standards test applies."); Godwin, supra note 8, at
8 (advocating use of the "cyber-community" for community standards analysis); Sympo-
sium, First Amendment and the Media, supra note 8, at 255 (advocating either a national
obscenity standard or the use of the "cyber-community" for community standards analysis);
Kim, supra note 8, at 430 (advocating use of the virtual community for community stan-
dards analysis).
189 See supra Part IA2.c.
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services, the World Wide Web, dial-up BBSs, or the Internet exclu-
sively; many others use a variety of on-line services. Why shouldn't
each service, or even each newsgroup, have its own community?
The third difficulty is preventing a proliferation of alternative
communities. If on-line computer users are entitled to have their
speech evaluated by the standards of a cyber-community, why
shouldn't other "withdrawn" communities be recognized? And if non-
geographical communities are recognized for Miller analysis, why
shouldn't they be recognized for other legal purposes as well?
A practical concern is also worth noting. The strong cyber-com-
munity thesis is frequently advanced by confirmed libertarians, 190 pre-
sumably in view of the early on-line community's near-anarchic
commitment to libertarianism. But as the on-line community grows,
its political center is changing as well. Those who advocate the cyber-
community today must be prepared to live with it when the moral
majority joins.
F. The Traveling-To-Obtain Paradigm
Willing viewers downloading potentially obscene materials from
on-line sources are best analogized to willing viewers who travel to an-
other community, buy the materials, and return home. This para-
digm is superior to the alternatives in several ways. First, it respects
the fundamental principles of obscenity law: (1) the privacy principle,
and (2) the principle that communities should set their own stan-
dards. Furthermore, (3) it is consistent with the scienter requirement
of criminal law; and (4) it avoids inequitable results. Part III develops
this view.
III
WHICH COMMUNITY'S STANDARDS SHOULD GovERtN
ON-LINE TRANSFERS?
The question of which community's standards should apply to
on-line transfers of potentially obscene material can itself be divided
into two questions: (1) is the on-line community (the so-called "cyber-
community") the proper community by whose standards to judge on-
line obscenity?, and (2) if the cyber-community is not the proper com-
munity, which of the geographical communities is proper (assuming
that the supplier and the recipient inhabit different geographical
communities)?
Question (1) is unique to the on-line domain, and there are two
versions of the cyber-community thesis. The "strong" or "positive" ver-
190 The Electronic Frontier Foundation, a private, nonprofit organization concerned
with civil liberties and telecommunications issues, is one prominent example.
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sion asserts that there is a cyber-community which should be recog-
nized by the law.19' Proponents of this view argue that transactions
on-line take place in this community alone; while the computer user is
on-line, he or she is a member of the cyber-community and should be
governed by its rules and customs, including its community stan-
dards. 192 Magazine purchasers, broadcast listeners, cable subscribers,
postal customers, telephone users, and handbillers can hardly claim to
belong to an exclusive community apart from their geographical com-
munity. But the isolated and private nature of computer communica-
tion, as it is normally practiced, lends an air of plausibility to this
claim. Part II.E.2 argues that this air of plausibility is insufficient to
establish the theory as a doctrine of law.
The weaker, "negative" version does not advocate the literal exis-
tence of a non-geographical community. It asserts that on-line inter-
action does not touch any geographical community, and that
therefore no geographical community's standards can apply because
no geographical community is affected. 193 Although the strong ver-
sion of the cyber-community thesis postulates a new entity which
should be recognized by the law, the weak version simply denies that
on-line transactions are part of the user's geographical community.
In this respect it is a privacy argument, and it is relevant to the issue of
First Amendment protection for obscene materials in the on-line con-
text under this Note's analysis, which displays the protection issue as a
conflict of privacy rights.194 If the weak cyber-community argument
succeeds, the on-line context is not a public but a private context, and
obscene materials would enjoy First and Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tection on-line just as they do in the privacy of the home.
Question (2) is not unique to on-line obscenity cases. Whether
the allegedly obscene material was mailed, received over the airwaves
or on cable, purchased at a newsstand, or spoken over the phone, the
sender can always ask why he should be subject to the standards of a
community to which he does not belong. In the conventional cases,
the law answers that the community into which the material was trans-
ported has been touched by the material, and that the sender can be
held liable for the offensive contact.
A defendant might respond by borrowing the "no contact" argu-
ment from the proponent of the weak cyber-community thesis. If he
can make good the argument that on-line interaction is fundamen-
191 See Branscomb, supra note 8, 1252-54; Godwin, supra note 8, at 8; and Kim, supra
note 8, at 430.
192 See Branscomb, supra note 8, 1252-54; Godwin, supra note 8, at 8; and Kim, supra
note 8, at 430.
193 See, e.g., Byassee, supra note 5, at 208-09.
194 See discussion supra Part I.B.
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tally different from the conventional means of distribution, the ration-
ale upon which the liability of a sender in the receiving community is
predicated is undermined.
If this argument succeeds, the result is not that obscene materials
enjoy the same First Amendment protection on-line that they do in
the home, but that the community whose standards apply to on-line
providers of potentially obscene material is the community where the
provider is located. This argument is made good by the fact that on-
line transactions more closely resemble the recipient traveling to the
provider's location and returning with the allegedly obscene material
than they resemble any of the conventional means of distribution.
This view has the virtue of being consistent with the privacy-based
right to possess obscene materials at home, 95 as well as the other fun-
damental principles underlying obscenity law.
A. The Privacy Rationale
This Note has developed a view of obscenity jurisprudence
grounded on the conflicting privacy rights of those who would view
obscene materials and those who would prevent their own, and their
children's, exposure to it.196 Although the Court has shaded the line
between the respective privacy rights beyond the plausible boundaries
of the privacy foundation, 97 in the end the Court will not be able to
abandon the right to possess obscene materials in private.'98 If this is
correct, the right to possess obscene materials in private should ex-
tend at least far enough to protect activity that does not threaten the
competing privacy rights of unconsenting adults and children, be-
cause there the rationality of regulation stops.
The technology of computer-mediated communications has
made it possible to deliver potentially obscene materials into the pri-
vacy of the home without even the near-fiction of a risk of intrusive
exposure to unconsenting adults and children. At this point, the right
to possess obscene materials in the privacy of the home should protect
potentially obscene materials.
B. The Local Standards Rationale
Because on-line communication ignores geography to the extent
that one user cannot be sure where another user is,' 99 the application
of local community standards in the on-line context actually defeats the
ability of local communities to set their own standards. It imposes the
195 See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
196 See supra Part I.B.
197 See supra Part I.B.
198 See supra Part IlA1.
199 See infra Part IV; supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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standards of the least-tolerant community on all communities. But
the local community standards rationale is sound.200
To preserve the basic principle that communities should set their
own standards, the alternatives are (1) to accept the cyber-community
thesis and deny that any geographic community's standards apply to
on-line transfers; or (2) to hold on-line suppliers of potentially ob-
scene material to their local community standards. Otherwise, (3) the
Court must abandon the local standards principle. The first approach
is undesirable because it is implausible to think that computer users
are absent from their geographic communities when they are on-line,
and because it is hard to see why there should be exactly one such
community that comprises all and only cyberspace. The third ap-
proach is objectionable because the local community standards princi-
ple is a fundamental principle of obscenity jurisprudence and of the
American way of life. The second alternative is best because it re-
spects common sense and legal doctrine (which the first alternative
does not do), and because it respects the fundamental constitutional
principles underlying obscenity law (which the third alternative does
not do).
Holding on-line suppliers of potentially obscene material to their
local community standards is precisely the result achieved by consider-
ing on-line downloading of potentially obscene materials by willing
viewers to be analogous to traveling to purchase the material. The
San Francisco bookstore must meet the San Francisco community
standard for obscenity. A Memphis resident can travel to San Fran-
cisco, purchase the materials at the bookstore, and return to Mem-
phis. Assuming he or she makes it back to the privacy of his or her
home without incident, Memphis authorities are powerless to prose-
cute. And if for some reason the materials did contact the Memphis
community,201 action would lie against the traveler and not against
the bookstore. From the standpoint of fundamental constitutional
principles and from the standpoint of equity in the particular case,
this result is the correct one.
The on-line case is analyzed in exactly the same way. The Mem-
phis computer user travels on the "information superhighway" to San
Francisco and returns with potentially obscene materials. As long as
the materials are viewed in private, they are protected. If they contact
the Memphis community, legal action lies against the Memphis resi-
dent and not against the supplier.
The on-line transaction that produces this result is the common
case of an on-line download by a willing viewer. On the transactional
200 See supra Parts I.A.2.d, II.E.1.




analysis, the result may be different for other on-line transactions. If
the San Francisco supplier conducted a bulk e-mailing with samples of
the available material, for example, he or she might be liable in the
receiving communities on the ground of intrusion into the privacy of
unconsenting recipients.
C. Scienter
Scienter is the term "used in pleading to signify an allegation...
setting out the defendant's previous knowledge of the cause which led
to the injury complained of... [It] is frequently used to signify the
defendant's guilty knowledge." 20 2 Obscenity prosecutions require sci-
enter; an obscenity statute cannot be a strict liability offense.203 The
Court stated in Hamling v. United States204 that obscenity prosecutions
require knowledge of the content of the materials, not knowledge of
whether the materials are obscene.20 5 Scienter is necessary "to avoid
the hazard of self-censorship of constitutionally protected material
and to compensate for the ambiguities inherent in the definition of
obscenity."206
Recently, the Court held that "the presumption in favor of a sci-
enter requirement should apply to each of the statutory elements that
criminalize otherwise innocent conduct."20 7 In fact, "some form of
scienter is to be implied in a criminal statute even if not expressed;"20 8
the Court "interpret[s] criminal statutes to include broadly applicable
scienter requirements, even where the statute by its terms does not
contain them."
209
Under United States v. X-Citement Video,210 obscenity statutes which
require that the defendant knowingly transport materials in interstate
commerce,2 11 for example, may not be applicable to on-line suppliers.
In its analysis of venue in Thomas, the Sixth Circuit held that the appli-
cation submitted by Inspector Dirmeyer for an Amateur Action BBS
password, which involved submitting a signed form including his age,
address, and telephone number, taken together with telephone con-
versations Thomas had with Dirmeyer, constituted knowledge suffi-
cient both for venue and for the offense. The Court stated as dictum
202 BiAcK's LAW DIcTIoNARY 1845 (6th ed. 1990).
203 See Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
204 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
205 See id. at 119-21; see also Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 510 (1966); Smith, 361
U.S. 147 (1959) (knowledge of contents necessary for criminal liability); Rosen v. United
States, 161 U.S. 29, 41 (1896).
206 Mishkin, 383 U.S. at 511.
207 United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 72 (1994).
208 Id. at 69.
209 Id. at 70.
210 115 S. Ct. 464 (1994).
211 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1465 (1994).
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.that "Section 1465 does not.require the Government to prove that
Defendants had specific knowledge of the destination of each trans-
mittal at the time it occurred."
212
The Sixth Circuit seems to imply that the Thomases were con-
victed by the very effort they took to prevent contact between the po-
tentially obscene materials on their BBS and unconsenting adults or
minors. A non-profit anonymous FTP site on the Internet, for exam-
ple, is distinguishable on the holding213 in Thomas.
IV
CHALLENGES TO THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENGY ACT-
FINDINGS OF FACT
This Note has argued that the most common on-line transfers of
potentially obscene material to willing viewers relevantly resemble the
recipient traveling to the supplier's location, obtaining the material,
and returning to his home jurisdiction.21 4 Further, these transfers are
relevantly distinguishable from the supplier mailing such material to
the recipient.21 5 This Note has also argued that making potentially
obscene material available on-line is not a "pervasive" dissemination of
the material, and that for purposes of the Court's public/private dis-
tinction the on-line context is analogous to "dial-a-porn" and not to
broadcasting.21 6 Both arguments involve factual premises about on-
line communications, and therefore they are both potentially vulnera-
ble to factual arguments. A court might find as a matter of fact that
on-line distribution is "pervasive" or that the common transfers of po-
tentially obscene material resemble mailings rather than travelings.
Recent challenges217 to the Communications Decency Act218 have
caused two federal three-judge panels to make extensive findings of
fact which support the analysis of this Note.
Section 502 of the Communications Decency Act amends 47
U.S.C. § 223 to prohibit, inter alia, (1) the use of a telecommunica-
tions device to send obscene or indecent material with intent to har-
ass, annoy, abuse, or threaten; (2) the use of a telecommunications
device to send obscene or indecent material to a minor; (3) the use of
212 United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct 74 (1996).
213 Perhaps it could be distinguished even on the dictum. The court's statement was
in its venue analysis, and the scienter requirement involves an element of the crime, not a
venue provision.
214 See supra Parts lI.F. and M.
215 See supra Parts II.F. and III.
216 See supra Part II.C.
217 SeeACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), cert. granted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3414
(U.S. Dec. 6, 1996) (No. 96-511); Sheav. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), cert. filed,
65 U.S.L.W. 3362 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1996) (No. 96-595).




a computer to send obscene material to a minor; and (4) permtting a
telecommunications facility under one's control to be used for any of
the above purposes, with intent that it be so used.219 Section 507
amends 18 U.S.C. §§ 1462 and 1465 to include on-line transfers ex-
plicitly in their prohibitions.
220
Although it might appear that these provisions of the Communi-
cations Decency Act would affect on-line obscenity jurisprudence sub-
stantially, closer scrutiny reveals that this is not the case. Section 507
is titled "Clarification of current laws regarding communication of ob-
scene materials through the use of computers. 221 Because courts
have applied 18 U.S.C. §§ 1462 and 1465 to on-line transfers already,
the changes due to § 507 have no practical effect except to prevent
future Circuit splits in the unlikely event that a court in a Circuit
where the issue had not been addressed would otherwise decide not
to apply the federal obscenity laws to computer-mediated communica-
tions. The amended laws, like existing obscenity jurisprudence, leave
open the question of which community's standards to apply. As its
title states, § 507 merely clarifies existing federal obscenity law, and it
does so without addressing the question raised in this Note.
Similarly, § 502 of the Communications Decency Act does not
have any practical impact on obscenity jurisprudence. Because 18
U.S.C. §§ 1462 and 1465 (both before and after the amendments of
§ 507) prohibit the transfer of obscene materials using computer-me-
diated communications regardless of the intent of the sender or the
age of the recipient, the provisions of § 507 add nothing to existing
obscenity jurisprudence.
Although the Communications Decency Act does not change fed-
eral obscenity jurisprudence, it does affect computer-mediated com-
munications by prohibiting the transfer of "indecent" material (1)
with intent to harass, annoy, abuse, or threaten, or (2) to a minor.222
These indecency provisions have been attacked as unconstitutional 2 23
The Communications Decency Act contains an expedited review pro-
vision,224 calling for a hearing by a three-judge District Court pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 2284 and Supreme Court review of a finding of uncon-
stitutionality as a matter of right. Two three-judge courts have en-
219 See § 502, 110 Stat. at 133 (1996).
220 See § 507, 110 Stat. at 137 (1996).
221 See id.
222 See § 502, 110 Stat. at 133 (1996).
223 SeeACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), cet. granted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3414
(U.S. Dec. 6, 1996) (No. 96-511); Sheav. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), cert. filed,
65 U.S.L.W. 3362 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1996) (No. 96-595).
224 See § 561, 110 Stat. at 142 (1996).
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joined enforcement of the indecency provisions.225 The Eastern
District of Pennsylvania has enjoined enforcement of the prohibitions
against (1) the use of a telecommunications device to send indecent
material to a minor; (2) the use of a computer to send indecent mate-
rial to a minor; and (3) permitting a telecommunications facility
under one's control to be used for either of the above purposes, find-
ing the provisions both overbroad and vague.226 The Southern Dis-
trict of New York has enjoined enforcement of the prohibition against
the use of a computer to send indecent material to a minor, finding
the provision overbroad.227 The Court heard ACLU on March 19,
1997,228 and an appeal has been filed in Shea.229 Commentators ex-
pect the Court to affirm the decisions.
230
Both three-judge panels conducted extensive evidentiary hear-
ings, and both devoted large parts of their opinions to findings of fact
that are important for on-line obscenity jurisprudence and that
strongly support the analysis of this Note.231 It is significant that both
courts found virtually identical facts, because it would be hard for the
Supreme Court to reject facts upon which two independent three-
judge panels agree. It appears that the facts found in Shea and ACLU
are destined to receive the imprimatur of the Supreme Court and to
become the facts upon which on-line obscenityjurisprudence is based.
Some of courts' noteworthy findings are: (1) The Internet oper-
ates with no organizational oversight, and thus no responsible en-
tity.232 (2) The Internet does not "invade" homes or "assault" users as
broadcasts do; viewing adult material requires affirmative steps that
distinguish on-line suppliers from broadcasters. 233 (3) The risk of ac-
cidental exposure to adult material is not sufficient to justify regula-
tion.234 (4) Technical considerations do not allow Internet
"publishers" to restrict access by geographic areas or by age, or even to
225 SeeACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996), cert. granted, 65 U.S.L.W. 3414
(U.S. Dec. 6, 1996) (No. 96-511); Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), cert. filed,
65 U.S.L.W. 3362 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1996) (No. 96-595).
226 SeeACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 883. The panel voted 3-0 on overbreadth;Judge
Dalzell did not consider the provisions vague. Id. at 867 n.2.
227 See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. at 939-50.
228 See Greenhouse, supra note 150, at B10.
229 See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3362
(U.S. Oct. 15, 1996) (No. 96-595).
230 See Ronald J. Hansen, Ground-breaking cyberspace case near?, RICHMOND TIMES-DIs-
PATCH, Dec. 26, 1996, at E-5 (quoting Robert M. O'Neil, University of Virginia law
professor).
231 The findings of fact comprise approximately one-third of each opinion. ACLU v.
Reno contains 123 numbered paragraphs of findings, many of which identify more than
one fact.
232 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 832; Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. at 926.
233 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 944-45; Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. at 930-31.
234 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 844-45; Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. at 930-31.
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know the identity, age, or location of a recipient of their material.2 35
(5) Foreign sites account for a substantial part of the adult content on
the Internet.236 Both panels endorsed various software blocking and
monitoring programs that allow parents to supervise their children's
Internet access, 237 which are also the Internet community's preferred
solution to obscenity and indecency issues on-line.
Facts (2) and (3) appear to place the Internet firmly among
"non-pervasive" media like "dial-a-porn" rather than among "perva-
sive" media like broadcasting for First Amendment purposes. Permis-
sible regulation must not interfere with adults' access to material, and
if the least restrictive means of regulation available are still unreasona-
ble, the government may not regulate at all.238 Fact (4) supports this
Note's argument that the most common on-line transfers of poten-
tially obscene material are like the recipient traveling to the supplier's
location and returning with the material, and unlike either (a) the
supplier mailing the material to the recipient or (b) the supplier pub-
lishing and distributing a magazine. The on-line supplier of poten-
tially obscene material, who cannot know the identity, age, or
residence of recipients, and who cannot restrict distribution accord-
ingly, is like a bookstore dealing with a walk-in customer, and unlike
both a mail-order merchant who knows the identity and address of the
recipient, and a magazine publisher who can choose not to distribute
his products in certain jurisdictions.
Although the Communications Decency Act has no direct, statu-
tory impact on on-line obscenity jurisprudence, the attacks on its con-
stitutionality will have a marked indirect effect. The facts about
computer-mediated communications found by the two three-judge
panels, which will very likely receive the Supreme Court's imprimatur
when the Court reviews the decisions, 239 will guide the future develop-
ment of on-line obscenityjurisprudence. These facts distinguish com-
mon on-line transfers of potentially obscene material from both
mailings and magazine distributions, and support the argument of
this Note that courts should analogize the on-line transfers to travel-
ing to the supplier's location and returning with the material rather
than to mailing the material or to distributing it in a magazine.
235 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 845-48; Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. at 933-34.
236 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 848-49; Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. at 931.
237 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 838-42; Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. at 931-33.
238 See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. at 941 (quoting Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC,
837 F.2d 546, 555 (2d Cir), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988)).




This Note has examined obscenity issues as they are presented in
the context of willing viewers downloading potentially obscene mate-
rial on computer networks. It has developed a view of obscenity juris-
prudence based on the competing privacy rights of willing viewers
versus unconsenting adults and children, and demonstrated that the
Court has found the rights of willing viewers to prevail in private con-
texts, and the rights of unconsenting adults and children to prevail in
public contexts. This view explains the tension between the right to
possess obscene materials in private and the right not to be accosted
by them in public as a conflict of fundamental rights, and argues that
the "public context" rationale and the consequent allowable regula-
tion of obscene materials extend only as far as there is a risk of en-
croaching upon the right not to be accosted.
Computer-mediated communication provides a means to deliver
potentially obscene material directly to protected, private contexts
without risk of exposure to unconsenting adults and children. CMC
therefore poses a direct challenge to the rationales grounding obscen-
ity regulations. One recent prosecution shows the potential for
counterintuitive and inequitable results if existing legal paradigms are
misapplied to on-line transactions.
This Note evaluated several proposals for reform and rejected
those that seek to create a unified theory of the First Amendment or
of obscenity jurisprudence for the entire on-line environment. Such
theories cannot accommodate even the present diversity of computer-
mediated communication, much less modes yet to come. Instead, this
Note advanced a transactional approach under which each on-line
transaction is matched to the legal paradigm that shares its character-
istic features.
Reviewing available paradigms for the most common on-line
transaction-willing viewers downloading potentially obscene mate-
rial on computer networks-this Note concluded that the most appro-
priate analogy is to a willing viewer traveling to another community
and returning with the material. This paradigm is preferred because
it uniquely respects (1) the fundamental principles of the First
Amendment and obscenity law, (2) the scienter requirement of crimi-
nal law, and (3) the principles of equity.
Finally, this Note examined recent challenges to the Communica-
tions Decency Act and concluded that facts about the Internet found
independently by two federal three-judge panels, which are likely to
be ratified by the Supreme Court on review, strongly support the argu-
ments of this Note.
The view advocated in this Note carries three practical implica-
tions. First, judges should carefully characterize on-line transactions
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and choose the legal paradigm with matching characteristics. Second,
there is a conceptual framework available in the existing law that will
accommodate the most common on-line obscenity cases without dis-
tortion. And third, legislators should carefully consider whether regu-
lation is necessary since there is existing law adequate to the task. If
they decide to regulate, they should select the correct conceptual
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Cornell Death Penalty Project
are pleased to announce an upcoming
Spring 1998 Symposium:
How the Death Penalty Works:
Empirical Studies of the Modern
Capital Sentencing System
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